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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Q~F THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ROBERT HENRY MARTINEZ, 
HENRY AL VERIZ, and 
JOSEPH BERT MATTEO, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8796 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial held on April14, 1957, in the District Court 
of Weber County, appellants were convicted of the crime 
of rape and sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
The evidence revealed that on the night of April 9th 
and the early morning of April 10, 1957, in Davis and 
Weber Counties, a seventeen-year-old girl, the prose-
cutrix, had sexual intercourse with a number of boys. 
The acts occurred in the back seat of an automobile dur-
ing times when the car was parked and moving. It appears 
that two of the appellants here had intercourse with the 
prosecutrix, and that the third one, Matteo, attempted, 
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but did not succeed. Appellants admitted acts of inter-
course, and the substantial conflict of evidence concerns 
the use of force and threats. Prosecutrix testified that 
she was threatened, struck and forced to submit. Appel-
lants deny that any force or threats were used. The jury 
chose to believe the prosecutrix. Other specific facts will 
be mentioned as they concern a particular issue on appeal. 
For the purpose of clarity the points of this brief 
correspond to the points of ~L\_ppellants' brief. 
S'_LATE:JIEXT OF POIXTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIITING INTO 
EVIDENCE TESTIMQ~-ry BY THE DEFENDANT 
AL VERIZ THAT HE AND THE OTHER DEFEND-
ANTS WERE IN THE STATE SCHOOL TO-
GETHER. 
PoiNT II. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO IN-
VITE JURORS TO ASK QUESTIONS OF WIT-
NESSES, INCLUDING THE DEFENDANTS, NOR 
-""'I 
DID THIS CONDUCT RESULT IN PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
PoiNT III. 
IT W .. .X.S NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PERMIT THE WITNESS \l"OSS TO TESTIFY 
~.X.FTER THE JUR1~ HAD BEGUN ITS DELIBERA-
TIONS, NOR WAS IT PREJUDICIAL. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL, 
T()t~ETHER WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY HIM, 
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WERE NOT IN ERROR AND WERE NOT 
PRE.JUDICIAL. 
PoiNT V. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR. THE CO·URT TO AD-
MIT AS EVIDENCE c·oNVERSATIONS HELD BY 
THE PROSECUTRIX AFTER THE AT'TACK, NOR 
"'VV AS SUCH EVIDENCE PREJUDICIAL. 
PoiNT VI. 
ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE COURT, IF' ANY, 
WERE NOT CUMULATIVE, AND WERE NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS. 
PoiNT VII. 
THE E.VIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CO·N-




THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE TESTIMONY BY THE DEFENDANT 
ALVERIZ THAT HE AND THE OTHE.R DEF'END-
ANTS WERE IN THE STATE SCHOOL TO-
GETHER. 
It is to be noted at the outset that the scope of cross-
examination is always broad, and that the discretionary 
powers of the trial judge in permitting cross-examina-
tion are extensive. 
As conceded by appellants, it is proper cross-exami-
nation to inquire of defendants whether they are acquaint-
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ed. It i s generally held that it is proper to show 
association. That they had lived together at the State 
School for a period of time might have been significant 
in this case where the alleged sexual offense was par-
ticipated in by all defendants and appeared to be a con-
certed act. Their being together at the State School indi-
cates a closer association than might exist otherwise. 
For whatever effect it might have had on the minds 
of the jury, it is to be noted that the terms "incarcerated" 
and the "State Industrial School" do not appear in the 
transcript of record. The only term used in this con-
nection was "The State School." 
The admission of the evidence herein objected to was 
not prejudicial to defendants. There was already testi-
mony before the jury that defendants had been or were 
going to the State School. The prosecutrix and the wit-
ness Evans had both testified that the defendant Alveriz 
had said to them that he had been at the State School, 
and also that ''we are going out to the State School 
anyway.'' Counsel at trial made no motion to strike this 
evidence. 
It is submitted that the evidence that defendants 
were in the State School would be admissible for the 
purpose of discrediting defendants. It '""as held in People 
v. I-I alpin (1916 Ill.) 114 N.E. 933, that the cross-examina-
tion of a witness as to his occupation, associations, and 
conduct for the purpose of determining his credibility, 
is a matter to a great extent in the discretion of the couT't, 
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and does not constitute error unless the discretion is 
abused. See also Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th 
Edition, Section 880. In Sweeney v. State (1923 Ark.) 
256 S.W. 73, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: 
''The court did not err in permitting counsel 
for the state, on cross-examination, to ask the ap-
pellant if he were a gambler and whether he had 
been in jail. The appellant, in answer to these 
questions, stated that he had gambled some, and 
that he had been in jail at Walnut Ridge, at Po-
cahontas, and at Harrisburg. The connection in 
\Vhich these questions were asked shows that the 
prosecuting attorney was attempting to prove the 
recent residence, occupation~ and history of the 
accused as affecting his credibility." 
In a leading Utah case, this court, in considering· 
the problem of admissibility of testimony elicited on 
cross-examination, laid down the following rules : 
"(1) Any witness may be asked on cross-ex-
amination whether he has been convicted of a 
felony. 
(2) Any witness may be asked a question the 
answer to which has a direct tendency to degrade 
his or her character if it is pertinent to establish 
the ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which 
such fact may be presumed or inferred. 
(3) Questions whose only object could be to 
call for answers to affect the credibility of the 
witness and which answers would tend to degrade 
his or her character, but not tend to subject such 
witness to punishment for a felony, are permis-
sible over a general objection as to their relevancy 
or competency, in the sound discretion of the court. 
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(4) Questions whose only object could be to 
call for an answer to affect the credibility of the 
Tvvitness and which would tend to subject such wit-
ness to punishment for a felony, are permissible 
over a general objection as to their relevancy or 
competency, in the sound discretion of the court.'' 
EJtate v. Hougensen (1936 Utah) 64 P. 2d 229. 
PoiNT II. 
IT WAS NOT ERR.O·R FOR THE COURT TO IN-
VITE JURORS TO ASK QUESTIONS OF WIT-
NESSES, INCLUDING THE DE.FENDANTS, NOR 
DID THIS CONDUC'T RESULT IN PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
It is generally held in this country that it is not error 
for the court to invite jurors to ask questions of wit-
nesses. See 159 A.L.R. 347, Louisville Bridge and Ter-
minal Company v. Brow11b, (1929 Ky.) 277 S.W. 320, State 
v. Bradford (1911 S.C.) 70 S.E. 308, State v. Kendall 
(1907 N.C.) 5·7 S.E. 340, and State v. Sickles (1926 ~Io.) 
286 S.W. 432. State v. Anderson (1945 Utah) 158 P. 2d 
127, is a leading decision by this court discussing this 
problem. There the court, during trial, inquired of the 
jury whether they would like to ask questions of a mtness. 
Two jurors responded by asking questions, and this was 
attacked by the defendants as error. On appeal this 
court found no error. A portion of the decision is quoted: 
''Whether a juror ''Till be permitted to ask ques-
tions of a "\vitness is "\Yithin the discretion of the 
trial court. * * * The fact that the trial court 
granted the jurors permission to ask questions of 
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witnesses vvithout any special request from them 
for this privilege does not, in our opinion, in and 
of itself constitute error. The determining factors 
as to whether error has been committed is the type 
of questions asked and allowed to be answered. If 
the questions asked are not germane to the issues 
involved or are such as would be clearly improper 
and therefore prejudicial to the rights of the de-
fendants to a fair and impartial trial, the court's 
a1lo"\\ri.ng them to be answered would be error. As 
stated in Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd 
Ed. Vol. 5, Page 4539, Sec. 2320: 
'The privilege of examining witnesses is ex-
tended to jurors and may be exercised by them to 
draw out or clear up an uncertain point in the tes-
timony. It has even been said that jurors should 
be encouraged to ask questions. They should not, 
however, be permitted to take the examination of 
witnesses out of the hands of counsel and to ques-
tion witnesses at length, nor should they be per-
mitted to interrupt the orderly conduct of the 
cause with unnecessary questions.' 
See also cases cited supra. 
* * 
This privilege should only be granted when in the 
sound discretion of the court it appears that it 
will aid a juror in understanding some material 
issue involved in the case and ordinarily when 
some juror has indicated that he wishes such a 
point clarified.'' 
The court also analyzed the questions asked by the jurors 
and appeared to lay down a criteria for the admission of 
such evidence. 
''These questions might properly have been 
elicited on the direct examination of the witness 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and were such as 'vould clarify material points 
in the testimony.'' 
Appellants, in Point II of their brief, specify various 
instances in the transcript of trial when the court invited 
the jurors to ask questions, and claimed these to be error. 
Examination of the transcript does not reveal that the 
questions asked by jurors were improper .or prejudicial. 
They were not leading, and they met the test suggested 
~J~ove in the Anderson case, supra, that they "might 
properly have been elicited on the direct examination 
of the witness.'' As stated in the Anderson case, the de-
termination of whether or not jurors may ask ques-
tions is a problem to be left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. See also Krause v. State, (1942 Okla.) 
132 P. 2d 179. 
Where jurors have interrogated witnesses, it is the 
obligation of the party complaining to show that his 
rights have been prejudiced thereby. White '· Little 
(1928 Okla.) 268 P. 221. Analysis of the questions and 
the answers elicited in this case does not reveal preju-
dice to the defendants; they pertain to matters germane 
to matters which had been brought up previously by coun-
sel for the parties. Defendants have failed to show how 
they were prejudiced. 
We have not undertaken to quote these questions and 
answers which defenda11t objects to~ we believe they can 
be examined more readily in the trial transcript. In view 
of the standards suggested by the court in the Anderson 
case, and after exnmina tion of the questions asked by 
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jurors here, we submit that they were not improper, nor 
were they prejudicial. 
PorNT III. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FO·R THE TRIAL COUR.T 
TO PERMIT THE WITNESS VOSS TO TESTIFY 
AFTER THE JURY HAD BEGUN ITS DELIBERA-
TIONS, NO·R WAS IT; PREJUDICIAL. 
After the jury had started its deliberations, it re-
turned to the courtroom and requested that one Bruce 
Voss be called as a witness. Voss had not been called by 
either the prosecution or the defense; he had been with 
the defendants in the car during the time of the alleged 
rape and admitted having sexual intercourse with the 
prosecutrix. 
It has been generally held that whether a case will 
be reopened for additional evidence is a question within 
the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not 
be set aside unless it is clearly an abuse of discretion. In 
a Utah case, State v. Duncarn. (1942 Ut.) 132 P. 2d 121, 
where the right of the trial judge to re-open a case was 
in question, it was held that the court had the right to 
recall the jury and to re-open the case, to enable the wit-
ness to testify. The Supreme Court added: 
"The purpose of a trial is to obtain the facts." 
In Miller v. Commonwealth (1920 Ky.) 222 S.W. 96, the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky made the following 
finding: 
''Any member of the jury has the right, dur-
ing the examination of a witness, to ask any com-
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petent, pertinent question, and, after the jury has 
retired to consider their verdict, they have the 
right to return to the courtroom and ask that a 
witness, who has testified, be recalled if he is 
present or so convenient as to be quickly secured 
and in the presence of the court, the parties to the 
case and their attorneys ask the witness any per-
tinent, competent questions relating to matter 
brought out on the examination of the witness.'' 
In North Carolina the rule seems well settled that it is 
discretionary with the trial judge, whether a case will be 
re-opened for additional evidence. In Miller v. Green-
wood (1940 N.C.) 10 S.E. 2d 708, it was said: 
"It is altogether discretionary with the pre-
siding judge whether he will re-open the case and 
admit additional testimony after the conclusion 
of the evidence and even after argumentof coun-
sel. * * * (Cases omitted.) When the ends of 
justice require, this may be done, even after the 
jury has retired.* * * (Cases omitted.) '' 
It has been held in a South Carolina case that it is 
'vithin the sound discretion of a trial court to grant or 
refuse an application for the re-opening of a case for the 
introduction of additional evidence, even after the com-
mencement of arguments to the jury and later. Darniel v. 
Tower Truckvng Comparny (1944) 32 S.E. 2d 5. In a 
recent New Jersey case in reviewing the action of a trial 
court in refusing to re-open a case and permit the intro-
duction of evidence, the Supreme Court of that state made 
this broad ruling: 
''After either or both parties have rested, the 
admission or exclusion of further evidence is in 
10 
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the discretion of the judge, and this discretion 
extends to evidence offered during and after the 
argument, and even after the cause has been sub-
mitted to the jury, but an exception may be taken, 
and if the ruling be an abuse or discretion, relief 
may be had." Carlo v. Okonite Callender Cable 
Company (1949) 69 Atl. 2d 734. 
Defendants vigorously attack the admissibility of 
the testimony of Voss, but they have failed to show where-
in any prejudice resulted to them. A review of the \Vit-
ness Voss's testimony reveals that it closely parallels 
the testimony of the defendants, and in fact, it appears 
that he could well have been a witness for the defense. 
He testified that no force was used against the prose-
cutrix; that he helped her take her clothes off, and left 
the implication that he did this because she needed help. 
His testimony was to the effect that the prosecutrix had 
willingly submitted. Furthermore, Voss's testimony did 
not bring up any new matter; it related entirely to evi-
dence previously admitted. 
It is submitted that it was not an abuse of the trial 
judge's discretion to re-open the case and admit the 
testimony of the witness Voss, and further, if such evi-
dence was not admissible, it was not prejudicial under the 
circumstances. 
PorNT IV. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONDUCT OF THE T·RIAL, 
TOGETHER. WITH STAT'EMENTS MADE· BY HIM, 
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Defendants allege, in Point IV of their brief, that 
certain conduct and remarks by the trial judge were 
prejudicial to the defendants. For the purpose of this 
point, it will be necessary to consider each instance 
separately. 
On pages 26, 27, and 28 of appellants' brief, objec-
tion is made to two statements of the trial judge as they 
relate to the defendant Matteo. The court said that 
defendants' objection to testimony was "superficial and 
technical.'' Defendants attack this, stating that whether 
intercourse occurred between prosecutrix and defend-
ant was not ''superficial and technical'' in a criminal 
prosecution. It is noted, however, that after the objec-
tion was overruled and the prosecutrix was permitted to 
testify, she stated that Matteo did not have sexual inter-
course with her. Defendants also attack the court's state-
ment, ''The jury understands the situation,'' as amount-
ing to an instruction as to what the court feels the sit-
uation is, but the court does not reveal what it thinks 
the situation is. Defendants are merely suggesting how 
the jury was impressed; there ,,·as no sho"ring that this 
was prejudicial. 
Defendants next take objection to the following 
statement by the Court: ''The theory is obviously joined 
her, assisting the others, yon may go for,vard. '~ See page 
42 of the transcript and page 28 of defendants' brief. 
This statement does not instruct the jury that defend-
ant Matteo aided and abetted the other defendants. The 
court's statement is merely an explanation of the legal 
12 
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ground on which he overruled defendants' objection, his 
use of the term ''theory'' is significant in that respect. 
Certainly the court may explain his reason for such a 
ruling. 
On page 29 of their brief, defendants take exception 
to certain statements made by the court during the cross-
examination of the defendant Martinez as to how much 
beer the defendant had drunk. The court did not take 
over the cross-examination. The trial judge stated 
that he did not hear the witness's answer. Certainly it 
is not improper for a trial judge to seek to clear up a 
matter which he did not hear, or which he did not under-
stand. The court's statement did not indicate to the jury 
that he believed the witness was evasive. Martinez's 
answer had not been responsive, and the court sought to 
have a direct answer. It appears from the record that the 
Court might reasonably have believed that defendant 
was evasive. It was not insisted that the witness answer 
yes or no to the question, rather he was directed to "an-
swer the question if you can,'' and again ''did you drink 
8 or 10 bottles, or did you know~ Or, do you know~'' 
It may have appeared to the court that counsel was 
coaching the witness in this instance, especially since 
the court stated that it had not heard the witness's 
answer, and since counsel was now attempting to ex-
plain it to the court. Such statement, in any event, was 
not prejudicial. If it were held to be error every time 
counsel in a criminal prosecution was reproved or cau-
tioned, few convictions would stand. 
13 
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Defendant's objection to the court's statement at the 
beginning of trial concerning accessory before the fact 
and accessory after the fact is not substantiated. The 
court's instruction to the jury at the close of trial prop-
erly explained the law and removed doubts which may 
have existed in the jury's mind. Obviously, when the 
court made the statement at the beginning of trial, it 
'vas referring to a statement made by the prosecuting 
attorney in his opening statement. The terms ''accessory 
before the fact,'' and ''accessory after the fact'' are not 
familiar to the layman, and may have created questions 
in the jurors' minds. The court merely sought to make 
a general explanation and mentioned that the law would 
be given them later. 
It is to be noted that the conduct of a trial is in the 
hands of the trial judge, and his rulings should not be 
overruled unless clearly an abuse of discretion or 
prejudicial. The court sees the trial at first hand and is 
aware of conditions which may not clearly be reflected 
in the transcript of record. 
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury. 
Instruction No. 26 is as follows : 
''The court does not express to you any opinion 
on any of the farts in the case, for it is immaterial 
what the views of the court theron may be. Neither 
by these instructions nor by any words uttered or 
remarks made during tlu~ trial, does the court inti-
mate or mean or "rish to be understood as giving 
an opinion as to 'vhat the proof is or "~hat it is 
14 
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not, or what the facts are or what are not the facts 
in this case.'' 
This instruction served to cure statements made by the 
judge during the course of trial, which might appear on 
their face to be prejudicial. 
PoiNT V. 
IT WAS NOT ER.ROR FOR THE COURT TO AD-
MIT AS EVIDENCE C'ONVERSATIONS HELD BY 
THE PROSECUTRIX AFTER. THE ATTACK, N'O,R 
WAS SUCH EVIDENCE PREJUDICIAL. 
We concur with appellants' general statement of the 
law pertaining to the admission of testimony concerning 
a complaint of rape. A statement of complaint made by a 
woman sexually attacked is admitted as an exception to 
the rule that the evidence of a witn~ss may not be cor-
roborated by testimony of another witness who heard 
the statement made. There are limitations to that rule. 
One being that the details of the attack may not be re-
lated by the witness, another that the complaint should 
have been made reasonably soon after the assault was 
committed. Those elimitations do not apply here. The 
first point to be observed from an analysis of the testi-
mony which appellants attack is that contrary to appel-
lants' allegation, the details of the assault were not re-
lated. The only testimony made by the prosecutrix in the 
form of a complaint was that contained on pages 38 and 
39 of the transcript. We quote portions hereof. 
A. Karen asked me, she asked me if anything 
happened, and I said, ''Yes,'' and she said, '' Oh, 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no; have you told your mother." I said, "No, but 
I am going to.'' She said, ''Don't, come and talk 
to me first.'' And I said ''all right.'' When the 
telephone rang, mama, or about that time walked 
out with my toreadors and asked me what hap-
pened, and I told her, well, let's go down to Kar-
en's and I'll tell you, and so she was very-she 
didn't want to at first and I said, "Well I won't 
say anything until we talk to Karen,'' we went 
down to Karen's place, mama driving. She drove 
me down there. Karen came out. 
* * * * 
A. I told her that I had been with these five 
Spanish boys and that they had done something 
to me and she asked me what, and I told her. 
Q. What did you tell her~ 
A. I said they had sexual intercourse with 
me and she got real upset and started to cry.'' 
The testimony of the "'"itness Karen Evans as to 
the prosecutrix's complaint is likewise brief and without 
details. See pages 123 and 124 of the transcript. We here-
with quote portions of that testimony: 
A. I asked her what time she got home and she 
didn't tell me but pretty late, I said, ''did you 
get home okay,'' and she said, ''no.'' I said, ''no, 
what happened~" And she said, "I'll talk to you 
I a ter. '' And I said, ''get your mother to bring 
you over here now." She said, "what will I tell 
her." I said, "tell her that you 'Yant to bring my 
dress and shoes over and then 've will talk to her 
about it,'' or talk it o\'"er. And her mother came 
right over. 
* * * * 
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Q. Yes. "\Vhat did Ruth tell you~ 
A. I just asked her what, we sat there about 
5 or 10 minutes and neither of us said anything 
and her mother said "what's the matter with you 
two.'' And, I said, ''nothing,'' and Ruth said, 
"nothing," and I said, "why don't you tell her so 
we can do something.'' And she said, ''All right.'' 
Her mother kept saying, ''tell me Ruth, what hap-
pened.'' And she just kept saying, ''just a min-
ute.'' And finally it came out and she told her 
mother. 
Q. What did she tell her mother~ 
A. Right at the time all she told us, is that 
five Spanish boys were in the car and she said that 
they raped her. 
Certainly this testimony did not constitute a detailed 
description of events. What this testimony amounted to 
was simply that the prosecutrix was raped by five Span-
ish boys. There was no testimony as to names or where 
the assault took place, or under what conditions. 
There are three Utah decisions, two of which were 
cited by appellants which we feel to be determinative 
of this question. The first bears on the rule that a com-
plaint should have been made within a reasonable time 
after the offense. In Sta.te v. Neel (1900 Utah) 60 P. 510, 
a conviction for rape, it appeared that the prosecutrix 
did not complain to anyone about the offense until some 
time after the day upon which it was committed. The 
court held that it was error to admit the testimony con-
cerning the complaint, but on the ground that it was too 
delayed. The court, however, made the following state-
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ment as to lapse of time within which a complaint should 
be made. 
''While delay in making complaint may 
awaken suspicion, and tend to discredit the tes-
timony of the prosecuting witness, yet mere lapse 
of time is not a test of admissibility, but simply 
a matter which the jury may consider in deter-
mining the weight which ought to be given to it.'' 
In 1929, this court rendered a decision in State v. 
Christensen, 276 P. 163, also a rape conviction. That 
case is significant in that the evidence admitted there 
appears to be more extensive and detailed than similar 
testimony admitted in this case. The court's decision 
quoted testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix as 
follows: 
The witness answered: ''She said that, 
'Mama, I hope I haven't disgraced you; this man 
has had something to do with me.' '' The district 
attorney asked: "Did she state what the act was~" 
The witness answered: ''Yes, sir.'' Here further 
objections were made which were overruled. Then 
further questions were asked and answered as 
follows: 
"Q. You may state what your daughter said 
at that time~ A. She said that he had had sexual 
intercourse with her. 
''Q. Did your daughter make any statements 
to you as to the conditions, under what conditions 
the act of sexual intercourse took place' (Here 
further objections were made which were over-
ruled. ) A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. What did she say? A. She told me he 
had whiskey - She told me he had "'"hiskey, he 
poured whiskey down her." 
18 
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The mother further testified that her daugh-
ter, when she came home, was intoxicated, and 
that she ''smelled like a saloon.'' 
The court held that the admission of this evidence 
was not error. The court said : 
''It undoubtedly was competent to give tes-
timony that the prosecutrix complained of an in-
jury or outrage inflicted upon her and the nature 
and character of it, 'vhere and when it occurred, 
and that some one forcibly and against her will 
and consent had sexual intercourse with her, had 
ravished her. Generally, it is not competent to 
give testimony as to the name of the person or who 
it was that committed the outrage upon her; but, 
under the circumstances, the statement the prose-
cutrix made, that the defendant' had had sexual in-
tercourse v1ith her,' if not competent to be given, 
was harmless, in view that the defendant by his 
testimony admitted all of the facts and circum-
stances as related by the prosecutrix, except the 
force and violence, that he was the person with 
the prosecutrix, and had sexual intercourse with 
her. There thus, on the record, was no issue or dis-
pute as to the identity of the person who com-
mitted with or upon the prosecutrix, and no dis-
pute as to the fact stated by the prosecutrix to her 
mother that the defendant 'had sexual intercourse 
with her.' " 
Here, as in the Christensen case, there was no ques-
tion of fact as to whether acts of sexual intercourse 
took place; the issue was whether force and violence 
were employed. 
In a more recent Utah case, State v. Roberts (1937) 
63 P. 2d 585, this court upheld the admission of cer-
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tain testimony given by a friend of the prosecutrix. The 
decision followed and applied the Christensen case, supra. 
Consideration of the evidence here reveals no 
prejudice to defendants. They admitted sexual inter-
course with the prosecutrix, but denied using force or 
threats. Her complaint as related by witnesses was not 
a detailed description of events. 
PoiNT VI. 
ERRORS COMMITTE·D BY THE COURT, IF ANY, 
WERE NOT CUMULATIVE, AND WERE NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS. 
The errors here, if any, were not cumulative, nor 
were they prejudicial to defendants' rights. As early as 
1909, this court said, in considering the question of 
error: 
''The admission of the immaterial evidence, 
unless it in some way tends to prejudice the rights 
of the party litigant against whom it is offered, is 
no ground for reversing a. judgment. This rule 
has so often been declared that '" .. e deem it unnec-
essary to cite authorities in support of it.'' State 
v. Justese1~ (Ut.) 99 P. 456. 
In Sta.te v. Cox, ( 1929 U t.) 277 P. 972, this court was 
considering on appeal an objection that the admission 
of certain evidence was error because it related to inde-
pendent offenses. The court said at page 973: 
''We are inclined to think the eYidence was 
erroneously a.dmi tted, but in vie"T of the satisfac-
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tory and convincing evidence of appellant's guilt 
which stands wholly undisputed, the erroneous ad-
mission of the evidence does not call for a reversal 
of the judgment. Without the objectional evi-
dence, the verdict must have been the same.'' 
(Cases omitted.) 
In the recent Neal case, this court again reaffirmed 
the general rule : 
''We will not reverse criminal causes for 
mere error or irregularity. It is only when there 
has been error which is both substantial and 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused that a re-
versal is warranted." State v. Neal (1953 Utah) 
262 P. 2d 756. 
PoiNT VII. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIE.NT TO CO·N-
VICT THE DEFE.NDANTS OF THE CRIME OF 
RAPE. 
The offense of rape is defined in Section 76-53-15, 
UCA 1953, quoted in part as follows: 
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accom-
plished with a female, not the wife of the perpe-
trator, under any of the following circumstances: 
* * * * 
(3) Where she resists, but her resistance is 
overcome by force or violence. 
( 4) Where she is prevented from resisting by 
threats of immediate and great bodily harm, ac-
companied by apparent power of execution, or by 
any intoxicating, narcotic or anaesthetic sub-
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Appellants raise in issue the law of principals. Sec-
tion 76-1-44, UCA 1953, is quoted in part as follows: 
''All persons concerned in the commission of 
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the of-
fense or aid and abet in its commission or, not 
being present, have advised and encouraged its 
commission, * * * are principals in any crime 
so committed. ' ' 
Appellants here were all principals. The above-
quoted statute makes clear that one may be guilty of 
rape without having had intercourse with the person upon 
whom the offense was committed; see also State v. Brink-
man (1926 Ut.) 251 P. 364, and State v. Carter (1947 
Ariz.) 18 P. 2d 90. The significant terms of the statute 
are "aid and abet." Those terms have been defined as 
meaning to instigate, encourage, promote, or aid with 
a guilty knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the 
perpetrators. People v. Goldstine (Cal.) 303 P. 2d 892. 
Also, it has been held that in order to "aid and abet" 
another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the de-
fendant in some way associate himself with the venture, 
that he participate in it as in something that he wishes 
to bring about, and that he seek, by his action, to make 
it succeed. U. S. v. IJ!l oses (D. C. Pa.) 122 Fed. Supp. 523. 
The following cases are significant in revealing to 
what extent the courts have considered persons to be 
principals in rape prosecutions. In People v. lJlarx (1919 
Ill.) 125 N.E. 719, several defendants "~ere convicted 
of the crime of rape. Two of the defendants, foster broth-
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ers, appealed on the ground that they had not partici pat-
ed in the offense, and they could not therefore be con-
victed. The sexual attack occurred in the back seat of 
an automobile. The brothers were seated in the front seat 
of the car, one of them being the driver of the vehicle. 
There was no evidence that either brother participated in 
the sexual act or threatened or directly applied any force 
against the person raped. The car was driven about for 
a period of time while the sexual attacks were taking 
place. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the con-
viction of the two brothers. We quote the following 
extensive extract from that decision: 
"It cannot be contended, of course, that mere 
presence at the commission of a criminal act ren-
ders a person liable as a participator therein. If 
he is only a spectator, innocent of any unlawful 
intent, and does not act to countenance or approve 
the acts of those who are actors, he is not crim-
inally responsible because he happens to be a 
looker-on and does not use active endeavors to 
prevent the commission of the unlawful acts. 'Not-
withstanding these rules as to the nonliability of 
a passive spectator, it is certain that proof that 
a person is present at the commission of a crime 
without disapproving or opposing it is evidence 
from which, in connection with other circum-
stances, it is competent for the jury to infer that 
he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and 
approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the 
same.' 1 R.C.L. 141, and authorities there cited. 
It is clear that the plaintiff in error Alex Marx, 
who was driving the automobile, did not in any 
way take part actively in the holding of the prose-
cutrix at the time when she charges the acts were 
being forcibly committed, but the evidence shows 
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without contradiction, and he himself admits, that 
he drove the car several miles out of the way in 
Chicago while going from the cabaret to the hotel 
at Wabash avenue and Eighteenth street. His acts 
in this regard tend to show that he was actually 
encouraging and approving what was being done 
in the car. We think, under the authorities and 
the testimony in this regard, the jury were justi-
fied in finding that his foster brother, Peter Marx, 
was assenting and by his actions approving, there-
by aiding and abetting in the commission of the 
offense, as he himself said that he suspected what 
was going on in the rear of the car, and while he 
denies the act the prosecutrix testified that he put 
one of his hands upon her breast at some time 
while they were in the car." 
In a California case, People v. Macchiaroli (1921) 
202 P. 474, appellant was one of three persons convicted 
of robbing a man and woman and of raping the woman. 
The third count against appellant charged him with 
rape in that he aided and abetted one Gonzolez in the rape 
of the woman. The fourth count charged him with rape 
in that he aided and abetted Marsiglia in the rape of the 
woman. The evidence disclosed that the three came upon 
the man and woman in a car. They ordered them out and 
robbed them both. Then while appellant held a gun on 
the man, the other two, Gonzolez and Marsiglia carried 
the woman across the road and raped her. Appellant 
testified that he made some objection to the attack on the 
woman. The man who was "'\\rith the ~Toman testified that 
he heard the woman scream, but did not go to her aid 
because of the gun being held against him. Appellant 
appealed on the ground that there 'vas no evidence to 
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sustain the conviction of the two rape charges. The Cali-
fornia statute on principals is substantially the same as 
the Utah statute. The appellate court affirmed the con-
viction, holding that appellant did both aid and abet 
the others in the commission of the crime of rape. 
The evidence adduced at trial reveals that the sexual 
assault was a common venture of all the appellants. There 
was no evidence that any of them attempted to prevent 
the commission of the acts. Appellants assert that as to 
Matteo and Martinez, no force or threats were made. 
But the threats and force were applied at the beginning 
of the series of sexual assaults by the defendant Alveriz 
and one Voss. The prosecutrix was, in fact, struck twice 
( T. 27) with brass knuckles and bore bruises as a result 
of those blows. She was warned that her face would be 
"messed up." (T. 26, 27, and 29) Prior to the time that 
either Matteo or Martinez assaulted her, Alevriz and 
Voss had attempted to have intercourse with her. She 
had been struck and threatened ; she had screamed ( T. 
35); she attempted to run R\vay (T. 25); and shouted at 
a passing car for help, but was caught and forced back 
into the automobile. She requested on numerous occa-
sions that she be taken home, and she pleade4 with defend-
ants to leave her alone. The jury could reasonably be-
lieve she was too afraid or exhausted to further resist. 
After the initial threats and force, the prosecutrix could 
reasonably have assumed that any further resistance by 
her would be met by more force or blows. She testified 
that she attempted to raise herself several times, but 
was forced down. Under the circumstances she likely 
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believed that all the defendants were acting concertedly; 
they gave no indication that their purposes were not the 
same. It is often the situation in rape cases where a 
woman is assaulted by a number of men that her resis-
tance to the later attacks fails because of fear or 
exhaustion. 
It is alleged that the defendant Matteo did not have 
intercourse with the prosecutrix, and that he did not 
apply force or threats. He was, however, present in the 
car at all times, and he made no effort to prevent the 
assault. His private parts were exposed (T. 45) and 
he was physically on the prosecutrix for a long period 
of time, 45 minutes, according to his own testimony 
(T. 185) and according to her testimony, trying to have 
intercourse with her. (T 32) His conduct is certainly 
not that of an innocent observer. 
The prosecutrix's conduct in not reporting the 
assault until the following morning is not unusual, and 
under the circumstances, a jury could reasonably be-
lieve that she was too embarrassed, ashamed, or even 
afraid of her parents, to have reported the incident. The 
evidence is strong that this \Yas a scheme participated in 
by all appellants. All during the night some one or 
more persons were driving the car. Proserutrix was not 
taken home as she repeatedly requested, but the car \Yas 
parked, delayed, and driven in a round-about course, all 
while the sexual assaults \vere taking place. She testi-
fied that while Alveriz was on her, at least two \Yere 
holding her legs, and further, that some one \Yas al\Ya~Ts 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
maneuvering her legs. The force used against her was 
always by more than one person, as in forcing her down 
on the back seat and in taking off her clothes. The wit-
ness, Karen Evans, testified that earlier in the evening 
when she was with the group in Weber Canyon, that the 
defendant Alveriz warned her to stay away from the 
car, that ''those guys have one thing on their mind.'' 
( T. 117) He further implied that the group was planning 
to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. 
It is submitted that there was sufficient evidence to 
convict all three appellants. The testimony reveals con-
certed action, promotion and encouragement by the de-
fendants. The jury could reasonably have found that all 
defendants assented and lent their countenance to the 
assault. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
GARY L. THEURER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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